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REAL RIGHTS IN LOUISIANA AND COMPARATIVE
LAW: PART II
A. N. Yiannopoulos*
D. Real obligations
(&60 bligations" and "real rights" are distinct and distin-
guishable analytical categories in civil law. In the Lou-
isiana Civil Code, however, the clarity of concepts is blurred
by the category of obligations termed "real. 3 6 6 The juridical
nature of these "real obligations" and their relation to personal
or real rights are the subject of the following discussion.
Source Material. - Obligations are distinguished in the
Louisiana Civil Code into "strictly personal, heritable, and
real.'3 67 This classification, and the substantive provisions gov-
erning real obligations, have no equivalent in the French Civil
Code or in the Louisiana Civil Code of 1808. They were first
adopted in the 1825 Code on the recommendation of the redac-
tors. The sources from which these provisions were taken were
not cited but it was indicated that:
"The whole of this section is an addition to the Code. The
distinction it establishes are [sic] important in the admin-
istration of justice. The principles on which it is founded
have been long established in the civil law. The writers, how-
ever, who have been consulted establish only two kinds of
obligations with respect to their effects on person or prop-
erty, they call personal obligations, those we have designated
as such, but confound those which pass to the representa-
tives and those which are attached solely to real property
under the common division of real obligations. We have dis-
tinguished them by calling the last, as they do real obliga-
tions, but distinguishing those which descend to representa-
tives by the designation of heritable obligations; a division
which was the more necessary, as heritable and real obliga-
*Research Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University. Part I of
this article appeared at 23 LA. L. REV. 161 (1963).
366. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 1997, 2010-2019 (1870).
367. Id. art. 1997. See also Currier, Heritability of Conventional Obligations,
31 TuL. L. REV. 324 (1957).
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tions are not only different in their nature but are subject
to different rules. 3 8
It is a matter of conjecture which were the "writers con-
sulted" by the redactors of the Louisiana Code. Neither Domat
nor Pothier 6 9 dealt with "real obligations," and insofar as the
present writer was able to ascertain, the concept of real obliga-
tions and the detailed provisions in the Louisiana Civil Code had
as their source the treatise of Toullier.3 70 Most of the provisions
in the French edition of the Louisiana Code read as if they were
taken verbatim from the text of Toullier. The only difference
between Toullier and the Louisiana Civil Code is one of nomen-
clature: according to Toullier the term "real obligations" in-
cludes heritable and strictly speaking real obligations while
according to the Louisiana Civil Code the appellation "real ob-
ligations" applies only to the second branch of obligations
classified by Toullier as real. A brief summary of Toullier's
treatment of real obligations will precede analysis of correspond-
ing provisions in the Louisiana Civil Code.
Toullier's classification is based on a passage in the Digest
which indicates that some "pacta!' are "personal" while others
are "real."'3 71 This passage was interpreted by Toullier to mean
that "obligations" are either personal or real. Personal obliga-
tions were defined to be nontransferable obligations binding the
obligor personally and in case of nonperformance resulting in
his full personal responsibility. Real obligations were defined to
368. 1 LOUISIANA LEGAL ARCHIVES, COMPILED EDITION OF THE CIVIL CODES
OF LOUISIANA 272 (1937).
369. See 3 TOULLIER, LE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 476 (1833) ("This division of
obligations, [is] entirely omitted in the Treatise of Pothier.").
370. 3 TOULLIER, LE DROIT CIVIL FRANVAIS 476-99 (1833). Actually Toullier
was the first commentator to develop the notion of "real obligation" in France.
See GINOSSAR, DROIT RtlEL, PROPRIfTt ET CR]ANCE 97 (1960).
371. Digest 2.14.7.8: "Pactorum quaedam in rem sunt, quaedam in personam."
Pacta in Roman law were informal agreements which were invalid in civil law
but could be enforced by the Praetor in equity. The passage does not deal with
real obligations. It has been translated into English as follows: "There are cer-
tain agreements which relate to real property, and others which relate to personal
property. Those that relate to real property are those by which I agree in general
terms, not to bring suit; those which relate to personal property are those which
I agree not to sue a certain individual, for instance: 'I will not sue Lucius
Titius'." 1-2 SCOTT, THE CIVIL LAW 302 (1932). An accurate translation, how-
ever, ought to read: "Informal agreements (pacta) operate either against anyone
(in rem) or against a particular person (in personam). Informal agreements
operating against anyone are those by which I agree, in general terms, not to
bring suit; informal agreements operating against a particular person are those
by which I agree not to sue a certain individual, for instance: 'I will not sue
Lucius Titius'." The idea conveyed by the passage is that certain pacta de non
petendo (agreements not to demand a performance) are conceived in general
terms (in rem, not to demand from any one) while others are conceived in specific
terms (in personam, not to demand from a designated person).
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be obligations transferable to one's heirs (heritable) or to one
succeeding to immovable property by particular title (strictly
real obligations). Obligations of the last subdivision "follow
a thing like its shadow '372 but do not result in personal respon-
sibility of the transferee; he is responsible only qua possessor
of the thing and he may free himself by abandoning the thing
to the creditors. Obviously, Toullier was primarily concerned
with the problem of transferability of obligations and only in-
cidentally with the scope of a transferee's responsibility. In that
regard, Toullier distinguished clearly between rights (droits)
and duties (obligations). Rights, in principle, can be transferred
by their holder to third parties unless transfer is excluded by
the nature of the right, the law, or contractual provision. Rights
in things are quite frequently transferred by operation of the
law, even in the absence of specific mention in a contract de-
signed to convey title. To this category belong servitudes, all
other real rights attaching to immovable property, and the (per-
sonal) rights which the vendor of an immovable has acquired
by contract or otherwise for the improvement of the immovable.
Thus, according to Toullier, the right one acquires by contract-
ing with an architect for the construction of a house on a cer-
tain lot passes to the purchaser of that lot.3 7 3
In contrast to rights, duties as a general rule do not pass
to those succeeding to immovable property by particular title
unless they consent thereto. But in the field of property law, a
number of methods are available whereby a successor by par-
ticular title may be charged, without his consent, with the per-
formance of obligations assumed by his ancestor in title. One
method is to include in a contract for the alienation of immov-
able property charges or conditions which either suspend trans-
fer of title until performed or render the transfer void ab initio
if not performed. In all synallagmatic contracts, payment of
the price is an implied resolutory condition. If the price is not
paid, the thing may be reclaimed in whatever hands it is found.
Thus, Toullier concluded, the duty one has assumed to pay the
price passes to all persons acquiring the thing; but neither their
person nor their patrimony is bound and they can avoid the
obligation by abandoning the thing. The obligation of a third
possessor is purely real, non persona debet, sed res. The clause
of redemption stipulated by a vendor is also one of those obliga-
372. 3 TOULLIER, LE DROIT CIVIL FBANCAlS 499 (1833).
373. Id. at 485. But of. POTHIEm, TiAiTA DES CHOSES 523 (1778).
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tions imposed as a condition to transfer of title and the consti-
tution of a rent charge in kind or money is still another example.
These results are based on the maxim that no one can transfer
a greater right than he himself has.
A second method consists in dismembering the right of own-
ership and transferring a real right to a person who will be
able to assert this right against the world. The obligations of
the landowner who dismembers his ownership pass to all suc-
cessors who are "bound" to permit the exercise of real rights
granted by the former landowner. Thus the holders of the
rights of real mortgage, servitudes, usufruct, use, and habitation
are entitled to exercise their rights in the hands of any owner
or possessor. But not all real obligations are correlative of real
rights. Real obligations may also be correlative of personal
rights which attach to a piece of land and can be exercised by
their holder without the assistance of the landowner. To this
category belong rights deriving from a predial lease, the per-
sonal right of passage (which is neither servitude nor use or
usufruct) ,374 and conventional, legal, and judicial mortgages. In
all these instances the duty of the third possessor of the immov-
able is a real obligation although the correlative right of the
obligor is not a real right properly so called. 375 The last method
for the creation of real obligations is the establishment of an
assignat or assiette.3 7 6 These are rights to the revenues of real
property transferred to another person as security for a claim.
The Civil Code. - In the Louisiana Civil Code, an obligation
is termed strictly personal "when none but the obligee can en-
force the performance, or when it can be enforced only against
the obligor" (Article 1997, Section 1). An obligation is herit-
able "when the heirs and assigns of one party may enforce the
performance against the heirs of the other" (Article 1997, Sec-
tion 2). And an obligation is real "when it is attached to im-
movable property, and passes with it into whatever hands it
may come, without making the third possessor personally re-
sponsible" (Article 1997, Section 3). These definitions leave
much wanting in clarity of concepts. In the light of their source
materials, however, and on the basis of the text of the Code, it
is apparent that the criteria for these definitions and distine-
374. See 3 TOULLIER, LE DROIT CIVIL FRANUAIS 490, 491 (1833).
375. Id. at 489-90.
376. Id. at 487, 492-98. Cf. text at note 385 infra.
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tions are transferability and the nature of the transferee's re-
sponsibility.
According to the criterion of transferability, obligations are
either nontransferable ("strictly personal") or transferable
whether actively or passively ("heritable" and "real" obliga-
tions). According to the criterion of the nature of the trans-
feree's responsibility, transferable obligations are either heri-
table or real. Heritable are those transferable obligations which
result in full personal responsibility of the transferee. Real
obligations are those which attach to immovable property and
which do not result in personal responsibility of the obligor. The
obligor is thus held to a duty merely as possessor and may free
himself by abandoning the immovable. It is apparent that the
term "heritable" obligations is used in the Civil Code in a tech-
nical sense to designate transferable obligations resulting in full
personal responsibility of the transferee rather than obligations
transferable only by universal title-which would be the normal
usage of the word "heritable." In this sense, "heritable" is
contrasted to both "strictly personal" and "real" obligations.
Strictly personal obligations are nontransferable; heritable ob-
ligations are transferable whether by universal or particular
title 77 and result in full personal responsibility of the obligor.
Real obligations are also transferable obligations whether by
universal or particular title but result in limited responsibility
of the transferee qua possessor of immovable property. Analysis
of "strictly personal" and "heritable" obligations is beyond the
scope of this study. The following discussion is confined to an
analysis of the nature and function of "real obligations." Ac-
cording to the Code, the characteristics of a real obligation are
three: (1) the real obligation attaches to immovable property;
(2) it passes with the property; and (3) the third possessor
does not become personally responsible . 37
Following the civilian tradition, the Louisiana Civil Code
employs the word "obligation" in a double sense. This word at
times indicates merely a "duty" to perform and at times a legal
relation, a vinculum juris, a complex of personal rights and
duties whether imposed by law or deriving from juridical acts.
It would seem that in connection with "real obligations" the
Code speaks of "duties" imposed on the possessor of immovable
377. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 1997, 2009 (1870). Cf. Currier, Heritability of Con-
ventional Obligations, 31 TUL. L. REV. 324, 327 (1957).
378. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1.997 (1870) ; cf. Comment, Real Rights in Louisi-
ana, 21 LA. L. REV. 462, 463 (1961).
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property rather than of a legal relation (Article 2010). But
Article 2011 declares that "not only the obligation, but the right
resulting from a contract relative to immovable property, passes
with the property." Thus, the notion of real obligation is broad-
ened to include rights attaching and passing with the immov-
able. As examples of rights passing with the property, the Code
refers to "the right of servitude" and to the right of an heir
or other acquirer "to enforce a contract made for the improve-
ment of the property by the person from whom he acquired
it. ' 379 The first example, involving a real right, does not present
problems: real rights attach to property and pass with it. The
real obligation imposed on the possessor of the property is
merely correlative to the real right.38 0 The second example does
not involve problems insofar as an heir may be concerned: pro-
vided that the obligation is heritable, an heir should have the
right to enforce a contract for the improvement of immovable
property according to the general rules of successions and obli-
gations. But the picture changes when the juridical situation
of "another acquirer" is considered, namely, the rights and
duties of one succeeding to immovable property by particular
title. According to the principle that res inter alios acta aliis
non nocet,31 this person should not have any rights against one
with whom his author in title had entered into a contractual
relation concerning the improvement of the property. Nor can
the duty of the obligor be regarded as a real obligation: appar-
ently the obligee, the successor to the immovable, can enforce
the contract and hold the obligor to full personal responsibility.
The successor to the immovable, on the other hand, is under no
duty to succeed to the obligations of his ancestor in title. Thus,
if the third party would be interested in the performance of the
contract concerning the improvement of the immovable he could
not have recourse against the possessor or the new owner of
the immovable; and if he had that right, the responsibility of
the third possessor would be real. This example then presents
an anomaly and raises unanswerable questions.38
2
According to Article 2019, as between contracting parties
"some real obligations are also personal." Thus, a real mortgage
379. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2011 (1870). Toullier terms this right "an acces-
sory" of the contract of sale. 3 TOULLIER, LE DROIT CIVIL FRANVAIs 485 (1833).
380. Cf. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 2011, 2015 (1870).
381. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1889 (1870) : "No one can, by a contract in his
own name, bind any one but himself or his representatives ... "
382. Perhaps the best construction is to regard the right of the successor by
particular title as deriving from a tacit assignment and subrogation. In a con-
tract of sale, the owner of an immovable may by express assignment transfer to
1963]
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given by one to secure his own debt generates a personal obliga-
tion (since his entire patrimony may be seized and sold for the
satisfaction of the creditor) and also a real obligation (since
the thing subject to the real mortgage may be seized and sold).
Other obligations are "strictly real, both as to the contracting
party and his heirs or other successors." An example given in
the Code is a mortgage securing the debt of another without
assumption of personal responsibility by the mortgagor. As be-
tween a creditor and the subsequent possessor of the property,
the responsibility of the possessor is always real, excepting the
case where the third possessor has assumed personal responsi-
bility "by his own act."3' S 3
According to Article 2012:
"Real obligations may be created in three ways: 1. By the
alienation of immovable property, subject to a real condition,
either expressed or implied by law; 2. By alienating to one
person the immovable property, and to another some real
right to be exercised upon it; 3. By the creation of a right
of mortgage upon the immovable property."
These are the methods described by Toullier.3 8 4 An example
of the first method is "a sale subject to a rent charge, or to a
right of redemption as consideration [condition] of the sale."
Servitudes, the right of use, habitation, and usufruct are ex-
amples of the second method. These are real rights, namely per-
missible dismemberments of the right of ownership. The several
kinds of mortgages and the creation of a rent charge are ex-
amples of the third method. Now how the "sale subject to a
rent charge" may be an example of the first method and "the
creation of a rent charge" of the third can only be understood
in the light of Toullier's analysis of prerevolutionary French
law. 3 5 A sale subject to a rent charge is for all practical pur-
poses the sale of an immovable for a consideration consisting
in a portion of the revenues it produces rather than a cash price.
A rent charge is nothing else than an "assignat" or "assiette,"
namely, a right to the revenues of real property transferred to
a creditor as security for his claim. According to the Code, a
rent charge may be "imposed on particular property, independ-
the purchaser rights "resulting from a contract relative to immovable property."
According to id. art. 2011, this assignment takes place by operation of law.
383. Id. art. 2019.
384. 3 TOULLIER, LE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 487 (1833).
385. Id. at 492-98.
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ent of any alienation of it, for the security or extinguishment
of a debt; and it may be perpetual or temporary, and in either
case, forms a real obligation which passes with the land" (Arti-
cle 2017). The possession of the property does not pass to the
obligee, and this distinguishes rent charge from antichresis
(Article 2018).
The real obligation created by condition annexed to the
alienation of an immovable "is susceptible of all the modifica-
tions that the will of the parties can suggest, except such as are
forbidden by law" (Article 2013). It would seem that "forbidden
by law" are those modifications which would tend to establish
interests of a feudal nature and charges on land other than the
recognized real rights.8 6 The following articles indicate that
there are also "conditions implied by law," such as "the obliga-
tion to pay the price to the seller and to furnish roads to the
public." The obligation to pay the price to the seller is never a
suspensive condition in Louisiana38 7 and the obligation to furn-
ish roads to the public is merely a legal servitude. 38
Article 2015 declares that "not only servitudes, but leases
and all other rights, which the owner had imposed on his land
before the alienation of the soil, form real obligations which
accompany it in the hands of the person who acquires it, although
he have no stipulation on the subject, or they be not mentioned
in the act of transfer. ' 38 9 This article is a puzzle. The French
text in the corresponding Article 2010 of the Louisiana Civil
Code of 1825 reading "leases and all other real rights"3 90 seems
to indicate that leases are real rights (which is contrary to the
tradition) but at the same time regards real obligations as cor-
relative to real rights (which fully accords with the tradition).
The English version reading "leases and all other rights" avoids
the question of the juridical nature of leases but at the same
time implies that real obligations may be correlative to rights
other than real. This is a questionable proposition. Excepting
386. On this subject see the excellent discussion of Provosty, J., in his separate
opinion on rehearing in Louisiana & A. Ry. v. Winn Parish Lumber Co., 131 La.
288, 59 So. 403, 411-28 (1911).
387. See Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. St. Louis Cypress Co., 121 La. 152,
46 So. 193 (1908). In certain circumstances, however, the obligation to pay the
price may be a resolutory condition in Louisiana. See Comment, The Action of
Resolution as an Accessory of the Credit in Contracts of Sale, 1 LA. L. REV. 800,
802 (1939).
388. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 665, 705, 707 (1870).
389. Id. art. 2015.
390. "Non seulement lea servitudes, mais lea beaux d ferme ou d loyer, et tous
autres droits rdels. .. ."
19631
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lease, which although a personal obligation functions as a real
right by virtue of an express provision,391 and contracts for the
improvement of an immovable, 392 all other real obligations are
correlative of real rights.
Real obligations, constituting an exception to the general
principle that a contract cannot affect third parties,3 93 are
founded according to the Code on the maxim that "no one can
transfer a greater right than he himself has" (Article 2015).
The maxim admits an exception "where the neglect of some
formality required by law has subjected the owner of the real
encumbrance to a loss of his right, in favor of a creditor or a
bona fide purchaser."394
Louisiana Jurisprudence. - The term "real obligation" has
been used by Louisiana courts as synonymous with "servitude"
and "real right, '395 mostly for the characterization of mineral
rights,3 96 predial leases, s97 and restrictive covenants. 9 8 Contem-
391. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2733 (1870) ; of. text at notes 108-112 supra.
392. Cf. text at note 379 supra. In Breaux v. Laird, 223 La. 446, 65 So. 2d
907 (1953), a successor in title to a home brought action against the contractor's
surety to recover for structural defects. The Louisiana Supreme Court found that
contract and bond were "inseparable" and held that "the obligation which flows
from the contract passes to the successors and assigns of the owner." Id. at 450,
65 So. 2d at 908. This holding was fortified by reference to Article 2011 of the
Civil Code. The court said: "From our own research we find, and counsel for the
defendant informs us likewise, that there is no decision under this Article. This
court is, nevertheless, happy to be the first to interpret such a wise provision.
The Article has no counterpart in the Code Napoleon, Legal Archives, Vol. 3,
Part 2, page 1109. The article stands alone, unimpeached and unimpeachable. The
words of the Code in this Article apply to descriptive acts in the light of con-
sequences giving and granting in law rights and causes of action." Id. at 450, 65
So. 2d at 908. It is doubtful that the rule announced in this case will ever be ex-
tended beyond the specific facts there involved. This is a unique situation where
a personal right of an ancestor in title is enforced by a successor by particular
title without express assignment. Cf. Cambais v. Douglas, 167 La. 791, 120 So.
369 (1929) (the obligation to erect a building is a personal obligation).
393. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1889 (1870).
394. Id. art. 2015. Cf. text at note 405 infra.
395. See Schexnailder v. Fontenot, 147 La. 467, 476, 85 So. 207, 210 (1920)
"A mortgage, whether conventional or judicial, imposes a real right or obligation
upon the property bound for its discharge."
396. See, e.g., Frost-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Salling's Heirs, 150 La. 756, 764,
91 So. 207, 210 (1922) (mineral servitude: "a real right or obligation") ; Vincent
v. Bullock, 192 La. 1, 18, 187 So. 35, 40 (1939) (mineral royalty: "a real right
or obligation"); United Gas Pub. Serv. Co. v. Barrett, 179 So. 506, 511 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1938) (mineral lease: "a real obligation").
397. See, e.g., Coyle v. Geoghegan, 187 La. 308, 314, 174 So. 366, 368 (1937)
("the lease is a real obligation which accompanies the property leased in the
hands of the person who acquires it"). See also Canal & C. R.R. v. Orleans R.R.,
44 La. Ann. 54, 10 So. 389 (1892); Burke v. Wall, 29 La. Ann. 38 (1877);
Ernest A. Carrere's Sons v. Levy, 191 So. 747 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1939) ; Man-
teris v. Baton Rouge Poster Advertising Co., 12 La. App. 162, 125 So. 293 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1929).
398. See Clark v. Reed, 122 So. 2d 344, 349 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1960) (re-
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porary developments in the field of mineral law, however, have
rendered the concept of "real obligation" meaningless: mineral
rights in Louisiana are either personal or real rights. 99 Predial
leases are no longer classified as real obligations but as personal
rights. 400 The term real obligation is still being used in connec-
tion with restrictive covenants. But as uniform terminology in
this field tends to be established, and the Louisiana Supreme
Court declares that restrictive covenants are predial servi-
tudes, 40 1 continuous use of the expression "real obligations" is
a surplusage. This assimilation of real obligations with servi-
tudes and real rights in contemporary Louisiana jurisprudence
has effectively prevented the recognition of the "real obligation"
as an entity distinct from "real right." As a result, the clarity
of the distinction between "obligations" and "real rights" has
been advisably preserved except in very few isolated in-
stances.4 0
An example of the confusion which could result from the
recognition of "real obligation" as a distinct entity is the case
of Tucker v. Woodside.40 3 In that case, subsequent purchasers
strictive covenants are "servitudes, real rights or obligations"). See also Ouachita
Home Site & Realty Co. v. Collie, 189 La. 521, 179 So. 841 (1938) ; Queens-
borough Land Co. v. Cazeaux, 136 La. 724, 67 So. 641 (1915).
399. Mineral servitudes and mineral royalties are real rights. See text at notes
141-149, 172-204 supra. Mineral leases are personal rights. See text at notes
150-171 supra.
400. See In re Morgan R.R. & S.S. Co., 32 La. Ann. 371 (1880), reaffirmed
in Reagan v. Murphy, 235 La. 529, 105 So. 2d 210 (1958) and Harwood Oil and
Mining Co. v. Black, 240 La. 641, 124 So. 2d 764 (1960).
401. See text at notes 254-256 supra.
402. Cf. Louisiana & A.R.R. v. Winn Parish Lumber Co., 131 La. 288, 59 So.
403 (1911). In this case, a purchaser of timber lands agreed (as a part of the
consideration for the sale) to have the tonnage arising from the manufacturing
of timber transported by the railway of the seller. A clause in the contract pro-
vided that "all the obligations and conditions herein contained are declared to
extend to and be binding upon the legal representatives and assigns of the par-
ties hereto." Id. at 291, 59 So. at 404. In interpreting this contract, the Louisi-
ana Supreme Court held that "the obligation (assumed by the vendees in the act
by which they acquired the property) with respect to the future disposition of
the timber, then forming part of the real estate purchased by them, was a condi-
tion, annexed to the alienation of the property, which created, not a servitude,
either upon the property or upon the vendees, but a real obligation, other than
servitude, as to the property and the vendees, which passes with the title, and also
a personal obligation as to the vendees." Id. at 303, 59 So. at 408. Upon rehear-
ing, however, this language was repudiated. The court stated that a decision on
the question whether the tonnage contract constituted a real obligation was "un-
necessary" since the purchaser had not parted with his title. "These contracts
suggest a return to feudal times," the court said, "when the lord of the manor
held the small farmers under his control and domination. But this is a matter
which commends itself to the careful consideration of the General Assembly, which
is now in session in this state. We prefer under the circumstances, not to express
our opinion upon this very weighty matter." Id. at 312, 59 So. at 411.
403. 53 So. 2d 503 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1951).
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
of a farm sought to annul a stipulation incorporated in the deed
of transfer to their ancestor in title which prohibited erection
on the premises, forever, of a "saloon, nightclub, or tourist
court." An additional clause in the same deed provided that "all
obligations herein assumed, shall inure to the benefit of and
be binding upon the heirs, successors and assigns of the respec-
tive parties thereto." The validity of the restriction, and its
binding effect on subsequent purchasers, was upheld on several
grounds. The court declared: (1) that the enumeration of meth-
ods for establishment of real obligations in Article 2012 of the
Civil Code was merely demonstrative and not exclusive; accord-
ingly, the restriction in question was a "real obligation" though
not included in the enumeration of Article 2012; (2) that the
first purchaser "did not acquire . . . the full, free and unre-
stricted use of the land," and, therefore, "could not transfer a
greater right than she herself had acquired"; (3) that "under
the express terms of the deed, the restrictive covenant inured
to the benefit of and was binding upon the heirs, successors,
and assigns" of the first purchaser; and (4) that the stipula-
tion was valid since it was neither forbidden by law nor con-
trary to good morals and public order.
All these grounds require comment. In the first place, there
is room for doubt that the enumeration of methods for the
creation of real obligations in Article 2012 is merely demonstra-
tive. Actually, analysis of the historical sources of this article
tend to confirm the view that the enumeration of methods is
exclusive. 40 4 But, assuming arguendo that real obligations may
be created by methods other than those enumerated, there is
still a pretermitted question as to the permissibility of the par-
ticular method employed and the validity of the stipulation.
Secondly, although the first purchaser did not acquire the free
and unrestricted use of the land, it does not necessarily follow
that subsequent purchasers should be bound by the restriction.
The court said that the first purchaser "could not transfer a
greater right than she herself had acquired," but this is not
always so. Application of this maxim depends on the prelimi-
nary question whether the restriction is an obligation or a real
right. In the field of the law of obligations the maxim functions
404. See separate opinion by Provosty, J., in Louisiana & A.R.R. v. Winn
Parish Lumber Co., 131 La. 288, 59 So. 403, 411-28 (1911). See also Cambais
v. Douglas, 167 La. 791, 120 So. 369 (1929). Indeed, if "real obligation" is
another name for "real right," the enumeration in Article 2012 ought to be re-
garded as exclusive. See text at note 386 supra.
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freely; in the field of the law of property ordinarily one cannot
transfer a greater real right than one has but one can always
transfer ownership free of all obligations 40 5 contracted with
respect to the thing transferred. This analysis indicates that the
court, perhaps without realizing it and by clear implication,
classified the restriction in question as a real right, which
should necessarily burden the land in case of transfer.40 6 Third-
ly, the court stated that one may contract an obligation binding
on his "assigns," namely successors by particular title. This is
one of the most controversial issues in the law of obligations.4 07
In general, "onerous" stipulations pour autrui are not binding
on third parties to the contract.40 8  An obligation assumed on
behalf of third parties may be valid and binding only according
to the principles of representation. Obligations binding on suc-
cessors by particular title are not "obligations" but duties cor-
405. For example, a reprobated land charge, e.g., a servitude in faciendo im-
posed as a condition for the transfer of an immovable, may constitute a valid
personal obligation of the transferee. This obligation is not transmitted to a sub-
sequent acquirer by particular title who thus "acquires a greater right" than
that of his ancestor in title. See Louisiana & A. R.R. v. Winn Parish Lumber Co.,
131 La. 288, 59 So. 403 (1911). Similarly, the transferee of a tract of land may
bind himself to erect a certain type of building. This constitutes a valid personal
obligation. But a subsequent acquirer by particular title is not bound to perform
the obligation of his ancestor in title. See Cambais v. Douglas, 167 La. 791, 120
So. 369 (1929). Conversely, a successor in title may acquire a greater right than
that accorded to him by his ancestor in case of a transfer subject to an invalid
condition. Thus a "conditional sale" vests full title in the transferee. See Barber
Asphalt Paving Co. v. St. Louis Cypress Co., 121 La. 152, 46 So. 193 (1908).
And where a transfer is made subject to a perpetual restriction on alienation,
the transferee acquires by operation of law a greater right than that accorded to
him by his ancestor since the condition is disregarded. See Female Orphan Society
v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n, 119 La. 278, 44 So. 15 (1907).
406. In civil law, land charges binding on successors by particular title are
always obligatons correlative of real rights. Conversely, only real rights generate
correlative obligations which are transmitted to a successor by particular title by
operation of the law. Cf. separate opinion by Provosty, J., in Louisiana & A. R.R.
v. Winn Parish Lumber Co., 131 La. 288, 59 So. 403, 427 (1911). Justice Pro-
vosty concluded on the basis of an exhaustive analysis of the historical sources
of the Louisiana Civil Code that real rights and real obligations are synonymous
terms and that all "innominate" land charges are "servitudes" : "We cannot change
the nature of this charge, or disguise the fact that it is a servitude, by refusing
to call it a servitude, and designating it by its generic name of a real obligation,
or of a condition imposed upon the title; but a real right of that kind, or a con-
dition of that kind imposed upon the title, is a servitude. A charge imposed upon
property, by which the owners of it, simply because they are owners of it, are
bound to do something, is a servitude. It is servitude, and nothing else." 59 So.
at 427.
407. See in general WEILL, LA RELATIVITt DES CONVENTIONS EN DROIT PRIVY.
FRANQAIS 1007-30 (1939).
408. See separate opinion by Provosty, J., in Louisiana & A. R.R. v. Wynn
Parish Lumber Co., 131 La. 288, 59 So. 403, 426 (1911) : "By contract, then, a
person has the widest liberty to bind himself; his right to do so is what is known
as liberty to contract; he has no power, however, to bind third persons, not parties
to his contract." Cf. Smith, Third Party Beneficiaries in Louisiana: The Stipula-
tion Pour Autrui, 11 TUL. L. REV. 18 (1936).
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relative of real rights. Nothing but confusion results when these
duties are termed "real obligations." And fourthly, another
objection relates to the declaration that a real obligation is valid
if not forbidden by law and not in conflict with good morals
and public order. These are loose tests, and if the analysis that
"real obligation" is nothing else but the passive side of a real
right is correct, then the door is left wide open for the creation
of an "unregulated brood" of interests which have no place in a
civil law jurisdiction.0 9 What cannot be accomplished by the
"real right" concept is easily accomplished through the magic
of "real obligation."
The stipulation in the original deed of transfer was intended
to bind all subsequent owners of the land and the question is
whether it could accomplish this purpose. According to the sys-
tem of the Civil Code successors by particular title are not bound
by purely personal obligations of their ancestor but are bound
to respect all existing real rights. 41  Did this stipulation create
a real right? This question should be answered directly. Clearly,
the stipulation was not a building restriction imposed by a sub-
divider in the interest of future owners of neighboring property
nor one which could be classified as a predial servitude. Nor was
it a dismemberment of ownership in the nature of a personal
servitude in favor of a person having a legitimate interest in
the restriction.411 It was a perpetual restriction on the use of
property heretofore unknown to Louisiana law and one which
defied classification within the established categories of real
rights. Indeed, the court's reliance on the Frost-Johnson case 412
is sufficient indication that a new kind of real right was being
enforced. And one may wonder whether there was sufficient
409. Separate opinion by Provosty, J., in Louisiana & A. R.R. v. Wynn Par-
ish Lumber Co., 131 La. 288, 59 So. 403, 419 (1911).
410. See 10 DURANTON, COURS DE DROIT FRANCAIS 259 (1834) : "Successors
by particular title. . . merely have the rights that their author had. They are not
found by his personal obligations, but must tolerate the exercise of real rights
which he has imposed on the object for the benefit of third persons. In one word,
habent causam auctoris sui propter rem."
411. Cf. separate opinion by Provosty, J., in Louisiana & A. R.R. v. Winn
Parish Lumber Co., 131 La. 288, 59 So. 403, 419 (1911) : "Personal servitudes
. . . terminate with the life of the beneficiary, and . . . 'this kind of servitudes is
of three sorts -usufruct, use, and habitation.' Not of four or more sorts, note.
Not whatever unregulated brood of personal servitudes owners of estates may
choose to create; but of three sorts -usufruct, use, and habitation."
412. Frost-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Sailing's Heirs, 150 La. 756, 91 So. 207
(1922), recognizing the "new" real right of mineral servitude. Characteristically,
the Frost-Johnson case was cited as authority for the recognition of still another
real right, the mineral royalty. See Vincent v. Bullock, 192 La. 1, 187 So. 35
(1939).
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social interest to justify recognition of the restriction as a real
right and whether a Pandora's box had not been opened quite
unnecessarily.
Critique. - The distinction of obligations in the Civil Code
into strictly personal, heritable, and real tends to confuse the
traditional notion of "obligation" (which is either a personal duty
or a complex of personal rights and duties, a vinculum juris
between two persons) with "real right" (which is a proprietary
interest in things available against the world). Neither the
French Civil Code nor any other modern Civil Code has formally
established this distinction, the Louisiana Civil Code being an
isolated example in the civil law world. 413 Problems dealt with
in terms of this distinction by Toullier and the Louisiana Civil
Code are consistently handled by continental jurisprudence and
doctrine as problems of transferability of obligations and re-
sponsibility of a successor to property.414
In most of the great commentaries on the French Civil Code
the notion of real obligation is either completely ignored or
merely mentioned briefly.415 Real obligations have been dis-
cussed extensively only by Toullier 416 and by certain modern
writers in a number of monographs. 417 While several writers
413. Cf. text at note 370 supra. The concept of "land charges" (Reallasten)
is known in the German Civil Code. Arts. 1105-1112. But these land charges
are not an intermediary category of rights between personal and real rights; they
are either personal rights or real rights, namely servitudes. See WOLFF AND
RAISER, SACHENRECHT 510 (1957).
414. See 6 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITt PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS
421427 (1952). See also 4 AUBRY ET RAU, COURS BE DROIT CIVIL FRANAIS 60
(1902); 11 BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE, TRAITIt TH1fORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE DROIT
CIVIL 249 (1900) ; 2 DELVINCOURT, COURS BE CODE CIVIL 116 (1824) ; 6 DE-
MOGUE, TRAITS" DES OBLIGATIONS EN GNtrRAL 75 (1931) ; 14 DEMOLOMBE, TRAITt
DES CONTRATS 263-270 (1877); 10 DURANTON, COURS DE DROIT FRANVAIS 259
(1834) ; 2 JOSSERAND, COURS DE DROIT CIVIL POSITIF FRAN(AIS 135 (1933) ; 2
ZACHARIAE, LE DROIT CIVIL FRANUAIS 217 (1855) ; 3 id. at 361-62 (1855).
415. Cf. 6 DEMOGUE, TRAITt DES OBLIGATIONS EN GIN]lRAL 75 (1931). Under
the heading of "different kinds of obligations" the author merely refers to "real
obligations, whose debtor is bound as possessor of certain things. This is the case
of the third possessor of a mortgaged immovable, and of the acquirer of a leased
immovable bound to respect the lease." See also 4 AUBRY ET RAU, COURS BE DROIT
CIVIL FRANQAIS 60 (1902) ; 2 DELVINCOURT, COURS DE CODE CIVIL 116 (1824) ;
2 MAZEAUD, LE(ONS BE DROIT CIVIL 17 (1956) ; 1 PLANIOL, TRAITt tLtMENTAIRE
DE DROIT CIVIL 770 (1925) ; 3 ZACHARIAE, LE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 361-62
(1855).
416. 3 TOULLIER, LE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 476-99 (1833).
417. See ABERKANE, ESSAI D'UNE TIIItORIE GtN1tRALE DE L'OBLIGATION PROPTER
REM EN DROIT POSITIF FRANQAIS (Diss. Algiers 1957) ; GINOSSAR, DROIT RIEL,
PROPRI1Tlt ET CRtANCE 89-106 (1960); JUGLART, OBLIGATION RIELLE ET SERVI-
TUDE (Diss. Bordeaux 1937) ; KORNBROST, ETUDE SUR LA NOTION BE SERVITUDE
(Diss. Strasbourg 1936) ; MICiHON, LES OBLIGATIONS PROPTER REM BANS LE CODE
CIVIL (1891). See also BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE, TRAITII THItORIQUE ET PRATIQUE
BE DROIT CIVIL 314-436 (V Supp. by Bonnecase 1930).
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have used the term "real obligation" to denote a variety of
ideas,4 18 the broadly accepted meaning of this word is an obliga-
tion incurred as a result of the ownership or possession of a
thing burdened with a real right,419 an obligation propter rem
or in rem scripta.420 The essential characteristic of this obliga-
tion is that the responsibility of the owner or possessor is lim-
ited to the value of the thing. Real obligations in this sense do
not attach to immovable property only. Pledge, chattel mort-
gage, and usufruct of movables, being real rights, generate
obligations propter rem. It is only in the framework of the
French Civil Code that obligations prop ter rem ordinarily at-
tach to immovable property, as a result of the sweeping declara-
tion of Article 2279 of the Code which equates possession of
movables with perfect title thereto. In Louisiana, there is no
corresponding provision in the Civil Code ;421 and, to the extent
the common law bona fide purchase doctrine may not be appli-
cable, 422 the holder of a real right in movable property may
assert it in the hands of any possessor within the time allowed
for the running of acquisitive prescription.4 23 In all cases where
the holder of a real right in movable property may assert it in
the hands of a third possessor, the obligation of the third pos-
sessor may be said to be one propter rem and correlative of the
real right.
Controversies surrounding the juridical nature of real ob-
418. JUGLART, OBLIGATION R]tELE ET SERVITUDE 283 (Diss. Bordeaux 1937)
(real obligation described "as an intermediary relationship between the real right
and the personal right") ; MIC1ION, LES OBLIGATIONS PROPTER REM DANS LE CODE
CIVIL No. 2 (1891) (real obligations are "mere accessories of a right vested in
the obligee, a right which he may abandon; they are attached to the thing, and
they do not burden the person except as possessor of the thing and not as per-
sonally responsible"). For the ambiguity of the term "real obligation," see 3
ZACIIARIAE, LE DROIT CIVIL FRANVAIS 361-62 (1855).
419. See note 416 supra.
420. Frequently distinction is made between an obligation propter rem and an
obligation in rem scripta. Both are obligations incurred by a successor to prop-
erty by particular title. But the debtor of an obligation propter rem is freed by
the alienation of the thing whereas the debtor of an obligation in rem scripta re-
mains personally bound in spite of the transfer of the thing. See GINOSSAR, DROIT
RtEL, PROPRIT ET CRtANCE 166 (1960). According to this distinction the obliga-
tion of the mortgagor is one in rem scripta whereas the obligation of the third
possessor of a mortgaged immovable is one propter rem.
421. See Franklin, Security of Acquisition and of Transaction: La Possession
Vaut Titre and Bona Fide Purchase, 6 TUL. L. REV. 589 (1932).
422. Cf. Jeffrey Motor Co. v. Higgins, 230 La. 857, 89 So. 2d 369 (1956),
17 LA. L. REV. 854, 857 (1957) ; Thomas v. Mead, 8 Mart.(N.S.) 341 (La.
1829).
423. See LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 3476, 3506-3509 (1870) ; Security Sales Co. v.
Blackwell, 167 La. 667, 120 So. 45 (1928) ; Davis v. Hampton, 4 Mart.(N.S.)
288 (La. 1826).
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ligations and the meaning of this term are reduced in the
last analysis to semantics and personal preferences as to the
classification of rights and duties. Conflicting assertions may
thus be easily traced to various definitions given to the terms
"obligation" and "real right." According to the traditional
definition of these terms there is no room for the notion of "real
obligation" as a distinct entity.42 4 Strictly speaking, real obliga-
tions are always duties incidental and correlative to real rights.
They are "obligations" in the sense that they are duties imposed
on a particular person who owns or possesses a thing subject to
a real right, and they are "real" in the sense that, as correlative
of a real right, these obligations attach to a particular thing
and are transferred with it without the need of an express
assignment and subrogation. They are also "real" in the sense
that the responsibility of the obligor is limited to the value of
the thing. In this light it appears that the use of the term "real
obligations" is confusing and should be avoided; "duties inci-
dental and correlative of a real right" is a much more preferable
description.
This explains why real obligations are not mentioned in civil
codes other than the Louisiana Civil Code and why these obliga-
tions are not given much attention in the great commentaries
on the Code Napoleon. They are a theoretic construct of no
practical significance and can be dispensed with for the purpose
of a logical and comprehensive analysis of civilian institutions.
Obligations are thus distinguished into transferable and non-
transferable (and not into "strictly personal," in opposition to
"heritable," and "personal" in opposition to "real"). As a
general rule, obligations are transferable by universal title both
actively and passively. Specific provisions indicate which obli-
gations are nontransferable. With regard to the transfer of
obligations by particular title ("assignment"), distinction is
ordinarily made between rights and duties. Rights deriving
from an obligation are, in principle, transferable while the
transfer of duties involves conceptual difficulties as certain
codes fail to provide for forms of transfer. 4 5 In the absence of
contractual assignment and subrogation, the successor to prop-
erty by particular title does not assume the obligations of his
424. See RIGAUD, LE DROIT RtEL 429-30 (1912) (the obligation propter rem
termed "a clumsy concept, simply destined to mask the existence of real rights
in faciendo").
425. See 2 COLIN, CAPITANT ET JULLIOT DE LA MORANDItRE, COURS tL±k-
MENTATRE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQs 436-39 (1953).
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author contracted with respect to the thing. He assumes, how-
ever, duties which are correlative of real rights burdening the
property. If this were not so, real rights would be extinguished
by the transfer of property to third persons.
The preceding analysis shows that the notion of "real obli-
gations" in the Louisiana Civil Code creates more problems than
it can solve and that adoption of traditional civilian apparatus
may be preferable. It is therefore submitted that in case of a
future revision of the Louisiana Civil Code the notion of real
obligations should be suppressed. Regulation of real rights could
easily include treatment of correlative and incidental duties.420
On the other hand, problems of transferability of rights, and
duties, and problems connected with responsibility of the
transferee of a movable or immovable could be dealt with in
appropriate titles in the Code without employing confusing
terminology.
IV. COMMON LAW
Analytical jurists in England and the United States, in an
effort at systematization of the common law, have drawn a
widely accepted distinction between "rights in rem" and "rights
in personam.' '427 The terms derive from Roman sources42 and
correspond roughly to the civilian concept of real and personal
rights.429 A right in rem is ordinarily defined as "a right avail-
ing against the world '43 0 or "against persons generally" 431 and
a right in personam as one which "binds only a particular per-
426. Cf. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 599-605 (1870) (obligations of the owner of a
thing subject to usufruct). Similar provisions could be enacted with respect to
all real rights.
427. AUSTIN, JURISPRUDENCE 381-91 (5th ed. 1885) ; HOLLAND, JURISPRU-
DENCE 145-47 (13th ed. 1924); KOCOUREK, JURAL RELATIONS 189-202 (1927);
PATON, JURISPRUDENCE 232-36 (2d ed. 1953) ; SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE 252-56
(10th ed. 1947) ; Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710 (1917) ; Lawson, Rights and Other Relations in
Rem, in FESTSCHRIFT MARTIN WOLFF 103 (1952). Cf. Corbin, Jural Relations
and Their Classification, 30 YALE L.J. 226 (1921) ; Radin, A Restatement of
Hohfeld, 51 HARV. L. REV. 1141 (1938).
428. Cf. BUCKLAND & McNAIR, ROMAN LAW AND COMMON LAW 89 (2d ed.
1952).
429. The adjectives "real" and "personal" are sometimes used by English
writers to designate rights in rem and rights in personam. This terminology,
however, is ordinarily avoided as it can be easily confused with the distinction
of real and personal property and the division of rights into "proprietary" and
"personal." Cf. text at note 441 infra.
430. SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE 252 (10th ed. 1947) ; Campbell, Some Foot-
notes to Salmond's Jurisprudence, 7 CAMB. L.J. 206, 212 (1940).
431. 1 AUSTIN, JURISPRUDENCE 370 (5th ed. 1885). From rights in rein are
distinguished rights ad rem. A right ad rem is a specific claim against a partic-
ular person with respect to a thing, i.e., a right in personam. Cf. SALMOND, JURIS-
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son or persons. '432 According to Hohfield's definition, a right
in rem ("multital right") is "one of a large class of fundament-
ally similar yet separate rights, actual and potential, residing
in a single person (or single group of persons) but availing
respectively against persons constituting a very large and in-
definite class of people. 43 3 A right in personam ("paucital
right") is "a unique right residing in a person (or a group. of
persons) and availing against a single person (or single group
of persons) ; or else it is one of a few fundamentally similar, yet
separate, rights availing against a few definite persons. '434
This analysis is based on the assumption that rights involve
two persons, a res, and an act or forbearance.435 In rights in rem
the relation to the res is prominent, while in rights in personam
attention is focused on the relationship between persons. A
typical example of a right in rem is that of a landowner against
persons generally that they shall not interfere with his right of
ownership. A typical example of a right in personam is that
arising between the parties to a contract. These examples cor-
respond to the analytical distinction between "property," in the
sense of title, and "obligations." Property gives rise to rights
in rem; obligations give rise to rights in personam. The word
property, however, is also used in a broader sense to include all
pecuniary rights whether in rem or in personam.436 In this sense,
property rights and rights in rem are not coextensive concepts:
the law of property does not include all rights in rem while it
includes also rights in personam.437
PRUDENCE 256 (10th ed. 1947) : "I have a jus ad rem when I have a right that
some other right shall be transferred to me."
432. PATON, JURISPRUDENCE 232 (2d ed. 1953) ; cf. AUSTIN, JURISPRUDENCE
370, 394 (5th ed. 1885).
433. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reason-
ing, 26 YALE L.J. 710, 718 (1917) ; cf. KOCOUREK, JURAL RELATIONS 201 (1927) :
"A right in rem is one of which the essential investitive facts do not serve directly
to identify the person who owes the incident duty. This right is unpolarized.";
Lawson, Rights and Other Relations in Rem, in FESTSCHRIFT MARTIN WOLFF
103, 107 (-1952) : "They are in rem not because they exist toward all other per-
sons in the world, or as Hohfeld would have preferred to say, toward persons gen-
erally, but because there is no other person at the other end of the relation."
434. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reason-
ing, 26 YALE L.J. 710, 718 (1917) ; cf. KOCOUREK, JURAL RELATIONS 201 (1927)
"A definition of a right in personam will be formulated in the affirmative -
there the essential investitive facts serve directly to identify the person who
owes the incident duty. This right is polarized."; Lawson, Rights and Other
Relations in Rem, in FESTSCHRIFT MARTIN WOLFF 103, 108 (1952) : "The right
in personam may be expressed in terms of a line; the right in rem in the nature
of a field."
435. See 1 AUSTIN, JURISPRUDENCE 347 (5th ed. 1885).
436. Cf. text at note 441 infra.
437. See PATON, JURISPRUDENCE 408 (2d ed. 1953).
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A right in rem need not relate to a corporeal object. The
right to one's own reputation, availing against persons gen-
erally, is regarded as a right in rem.4 3 1 The breach of a right
in rem gives rise to a right in personam against the aggressor.43 9
Most rights in rein generate correlative duties of a negative
nature, i.e., duties of forbearance, but this is not necessarily
80.44° Rights in personam generate either affirmative duties, i.e.,
claims to a performance, or duties of forbearance.
Following civilian terminology, analytical jurists indicate
that rights in rem and rights in personam may be either "pro-
prietary" or "personal" rights. 441 "Property," however, is an
ambiguous term442 and the adjective "proprietary" has defied
efforts at a generally acceptable definition. Personal rights
have been defined "as the residuary rights which remain after
proprietary rights have been subtracted. ' 443 These rights sup-
posedly differ from proprietary rights in that they are neces-
sary for the development of the human personality, are non-
transferable, and have no pecuniary value. While none of these
tests suits common law, 444 accurate definition of proprietary
rights is important in the United States in the light of con-
stitutional guarantees accorded to property and in England in
the light of the maxim that equity will act to protect only rights
of property. Proprietary rights in rem are divided into jura in
re propria and jura in re aliena. According to Salmond, a right
of the second category is one "which limits or derogates from
some more general right belonging to some other person in
respect of the same subject matter. All other are jura in re
propria.445 Austin has singled out ownership as the only jus
in re propria and has described the jura in re aliena as fractions
or particles of the right of ownership. 446
438. Id. at 233.
439. See Lawson, Rights and Other Relations in Rem, in FESTSCHRIFT MAR-
TIN WOLFF 103, 118 (1952) : "It is not unreasonable to say that the peculiarity
of a right in rem is not that it operates against persons generally but that it
imposes a duty in personam upon anybody who takes possession of the thing over
which it exists."
440. See Campbell, Some Footnotes to Salmond's Jurisprudence, 7 CAMB. L.J.
206, 213 (1940). But cf. 1 AUSTIN, JURISPRUDENCE 371 (5th ed. 1885).
441. See PATON, JURISPRUDENCE 236-38 (2d ed. 1953) ; SALMOND, JURISPRU-
DENcE 256-61 (10th ed. 1947). Example of a "personal" right in rem is the right
to one's own reputation.
442. See NOYES, THE INSTITUTION OF PROPERTY 351-53, 535-37 (1936).
443. PATON, JURISPRUDENCE 236 (2d ed. 1953).
444. See Campbell, Some Footnotes to Salmond's Jurisprudence, 7 CAMB. L.J.
206, 215 (1940) (the distinction termed "unreal").
445. See SALMOND, JURISPRUDENcE 261 (10th ed. 1947).
446. See 2 AUSTIN, JURISPRUDENCE 847 (5th ed. 1885).
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The distinction between rights in rem and in personam is
sometimes confused with well-established distinctions in common
law procedure between actions, judgments, and execution of
judgments in rem and in personam.4 47 Thus, it has been asserted
that in the framework of the common law the term right in rem
may indicate, apart from a right which avails against persons
generally, a power to recover a specific thing448 and that classi-
fication does not depend only on the nature of a potential claim
but also on the availability of an action for specific restitution.
Historically, land has been the only thing that could be speci-
fically recovered at common law because in the case of movables
the defendant might choose between returning the thing and
paying damages. Accordingly, the questionable conclusion has
been reached that only ownership of lands can be classified as a
right in rem and that the ownership of personal property is a
right in personam.449
The preceding brief reference to the doctrine of analytical
jurisprudence shows that the analytical jurists have failed to
establish generally acceptable criteria for the distinction be-
tween "property" and "obligations" and between rights in rem
and rights in personam. Indeed, no clear line of demarcation
can be drawn between "persons generally" and "a particular
person or persons.'450 It is plain that the dichotomy does not
suit the peculiarities of common law which "stubbornly resists
Roman classification. '" 4 1 It is surprising, therefore, that in
spite of disagreement concerning the discovery of an analytically
valid criterion and the definition of the terms right in rem and
right in personam, the dichotomy has been said to be "useful"
for systematic purposes. 45 2
447. For these distinctions see STONE, THE PROVINCE AND FUNCTION OF LAW
128 (1950) ; Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Rea-
soning, 26 YALE L.J. 710, 714 (1917) ; Cook, The Powers of Courts of Equity, 15
COLUM. L. REV. 37-54, 106, 228 (1915).
448. See PATON, JURISPRUDENCE 233, 417 (2d ed. 1953). Obviously, the
author has confused the distinction between right in rem and right in personam
with the entirely different distinction between real and personal actions in English
law. Cf. MAITLAND, THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW 73-78 (1936).
449. See PATON, JURISPRUDENCE 233, 417 (2d ed. 1953).
450. See KOCOUREK, JURAL RELATIONS 197 (1927). In the Restatement of
the Law of Property, the terms right in rem and right in personam have been
dispensed with because the "term right in rem has no single fixed meaning." RE-
STATEMENT, PROPERTY § 5, Comment d (1936).
451. PATON, JURISPRUDENCE 235 (2d ed. 1953) ; of. HARRISON, ON JURISPRU-
DENCE AND THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 62 (1919): "This analytic division, and in
like manner, most of the analytic groupings of Austin, have only an abstract or
logical value and . . . they are usually inapplicable to the concrete purposes of
technical law."
452. PATON, JURISPRUDENCE 235 (2d ed. 1953).
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V. GERMAN LAW
According to the civilian doctrine in Germany, "private
rights" are divided into "personal rights" (Personenrechte),
"family rights" (Familienrechte), and "patrimonial rights
(Vermdgensrechte) .453 This classification rests on the purpose
of the particular rights, and, indirectly, refers to their object.
Personal rights are those closely connected with one's own per-
sonality. They guarantee the life, health, integrity, and the
free development of individuals.45 4 Family rights are those de-
riving from, and intended to protect, family relations. Certain
family rights have a patrimonial content, which is regarded as
incidental to the predominantly moral character of the family
relationship. Patrimonial rights are those which serve the eco-
nomic needs of a person. These rights, in contrast to personal
and family rights, are ordinarily heritable and transferable. 4 5
The patrimonial rights are divided into real rights (Dingliche
Rechte), rights of intellectual property (Immaterialgilterrechte),
obligatory rights (Forderungsrechte), and the right of inheri-
tance (Erbrecht) .456
The right of inheritance and the rights of intellectual prop-
erty may be mentioned briefly. Under the system of the German
Civil Code, the right of inheritance vests in the person of the
heir upon the death of the testator or intestate decedent. 457 The
right does not only bear on the particular objects composing the
decedent's estate but also on the succession as a whole. Accord-
ingly, under Section 2018 of the Civil Code the heir may bring
an action for the recovery of assets retained by one claiming an
adverse inheritance right. This is regarded as an infringement
of the heir's right of succession. In all other cases, an adverse
possession is regarded as infringement of a particular right
rather than as violation of the heir's right of inheritance. The
right of inheritance may also be an "expectancy" of remote
453. See 1 ENNECCERUS-NIPPERDEY, ALLGEMEINER TFLL DES RURGERLICHEN
RECHTS 291 (1952) ; cf. 2 BIERLING, ZUR KRITIK DES JURISTISCHEN GRUNDBE--
GRIFFE 174-214 (1883); LEHMANN, ALLGEMEINER TEIL DES B'YEGERLICHEN
GESETZBUCHES 80 (1957) ; Sohm, Die subjektiven Rechte im deutschen Biirger-
lichen Gesetzbuch, 73 JHERINGS JAHRBOYCHER FfJR DIE DOGMATIK DES BURGER-
LICHEN RECHTS 268 (1923).
454. On personal rights and the so-called "right of personality," see Yiannopou-
los, Introduction to the Law of Things, 22 LA. L. REV. 756, 757, n. 5 (1962).
455. See 1 ENNECCERUS-NIPPERDEY, ALLGEMEINER TEL DES BRCRGERLICHEN
RECHTS 295 (1952).
456. Ibid. For other classifications see LEHMANN, ALLGEMEINER TEIL DES
BOEGERLICHEN GESETZEUCHES 72-81 (1957).
457. Cf. B.G.B. §§ 1922, 1942.
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heirs to be called in the succession in case closer heirs renounce
or die without heirs. The rights of intellectual property form
an independent category of patrimonial rights. They do not bear
on things but on values (not necessarily "economic" ones) pro-
duced by the human intellect. In them personal and real elements
are combined, and their distinguishing characteristic is the pres-
ence of a moral right (droit moral) to the products of one's own
intellect.45 They are heritable and transferable and enjoy an
almost absolute protection in the light of special legislation. 419
Obligatory rights are those patrimonial rights which a per-
son (creditor) has against another person (debtor) for the
satisfaction of a protected interest.40° This interest need not be
pecuniary; its violation, however, gives rise to an action for
damages measured in money. The obligatory right, and its cor-
responding duty, may bear on a thing but only indirectly: the
right is always directed against the person of the debtor and
his heirs. Thus, in contrast to real rights and other "absolute"
rights, obligatory rights are "relative" rights which function
only against the debtor and his heirs.
Real rights are those patrimonial interests which bear on
a thing directly.4a1 They are divided into rights of dominion
(Beherrschungsrechte) and rights of appropriation (Erwerbs-
berechtigungen). The real rights of the first category confer
on the holder a direct and absolute dominion over a thing,
i.e., the right to use and enjoy the thing in whole or in part,
for all or for some purposes, and the right to exclude inter-
ferences by other persons. According to their content, these
rights are distinguished into ownership, ownership-like rights
458. See 1 ENNECCERUS-NIPPERDEY, ALLGEMEINER TEIL DES BIrRGERLICHEN
RECHTS 300 (1952) (with bibliography).
459 See, e.g., Law of May 5, 1936, RGB1, 1936 II 117 (patents); Law of
May 5, 1936, RGB1. 1936 II 130 (designs) ; Law of May 5, 1936, RGB1. 1936
I 134 (trade and industrial marks) ; Law of June 7, 1909, RGB1. 1909 II 499
(unfair competition).
460. See 1 ENNECCERUS-NIPPERDEY, ALLGEMEINER TEIL DES BI.RGERLICHEN
RECHTS 301 (1952) ; VON GIERKE, DAS SACHIENRECI:T DES BURGERLICIIEN RECHTS
2 (1959); 1 LARENZ, LEHRBUCIH DES SCH1ULDRECHTS 7 (1957) LEHMANN,
ALLGEMEINER TEIL DES BtRGERLICHEN GESETZBUCILES 74 (1957) 1 SOERGEL-
SIEBERT, BJiRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH 795 (1959).
461. See BAUR, LEJIRBUCHI DES SACHENRECHTS 6 (1960); 1 ENNECCERUS-
NIPPERDEY, ALLGEMEINER TEIL DES BtYRGERLICHEN RECITS 295 (1952); VON
GIERKE, DAS SACHENRECHT DES BYJRGERLICHEN RECHTS 3 (1959) BECK, GRUND-
RISS DES SACHENRECHTS 1-2 (1930); HEDEMANN, SACIHENRECHT DES BORGER-
LICHEN GESETZBUCHES 20 (1960) ; LENT, SACHENRECHT 1 (1960) ; WOLFF-
RAISER, SACHENRECHT 3 (1957). Cf. 3 STAUDINGER, KOMMENTAR ZUM B.G.B.
8 (1956) ; WESTERMANN, SACHENRECHT 4-6 (1951).
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of enjoyment, rights of limited enjoyment, rights of real secur-
ity, and real charges."62
Ownership is the most complete of the real rights. The owner
of a thing movable or immovable has the right to enjoy the
thing and to dispose of its substance, except as his right may
be limited by provisions of law or by rights of other persons.46 3
The ownership-like rights of enjoyment confer on the holder
the right to use and enjoy the thing, in whole or in part, but
they do not confer the right to dispose of the substance of the
thing because this right is vested in its owner. These rights
attach only to immovables and are emphyteusis, superficies, and
a number of Germanic feudal institutions which, for the most
part, have been converted into full ownership. 4" 4 They are
heritable and transferable subject to certain limitations. The
German Civil Code regulates in some detail the heritable right
to maintain a structure under or above another's land (Erbbau-
recht).465 The rights of limited enjoyment are servitudes, dis-
tinguished into personal and predial.46 6 Personal servitudes are
those created in favor of a certain person; they are nonheritable
and nontransferable. The personal servitudes are subdivided
462. See 1 ENNECCERUS-NIPPERDEY, ALLGEMEINER TEIL DES BtRGERLICHEN
RECHTs 295 (1952). Real rights may also be divided according to their content,
into rights of use and enjoyment, rights of appropriation, rights of disposition,
and rights of real responsibility; according to their object, into rights on movables
and immovables and rights in re propria, in re nullius, and in re aliena; finally,
according to their subject into rights belonging to a certain individual and rights
belonging to the owner of an immovable. See WOLFF-RAISER, SACHENRECHT 13-17
(1957). Cf. BAUR, LEHRBUCH DES SACHENRECHTS 15-22 (1960).
463. See B.G.B. § 903.
464. See 1 ENNECCERUS-NrPPERDEY, ALLGEMEINER TErL DES BYLJRGERLICHEN
RECHTs 296 (1952). The Introductory Law to the Civil Code had originally
allowed certain ownership-like rights of enjoyment which were permissible under
the law of the German Lander (states) to remain in force. See, e.g., arts. 59-65.
Most of these provisions have been abrogated by other legislation. The rights
recognized by the Civil Code. With respect to several other real rights the
legislative jurisdiction of the Ldnder has been expressly preserved. See Intro-
ductory Law to the Civil Code arts. 113, 184. But as to certain real rights which
were permissible under the law of the Ldnder, provision was made for the recog-
nition of the existing ones excluding their creation in the future. See Introductory
Law to the Civil Code art. 189.
465. See B.G.B. §§ 1012-1017. Heritable building rights are now governed by
the Decree of Jan. 15, 1919 (Verordnung iuber das Erbbaurecht, RGB1. 1919 I
72) which has abrogated, for the future, the provisions of the Civil Code. The
right is treated as a distinct immovable which can become subject of special mort-
gages and of other real rights. It is usually granted for a defined period and it is
freely transferable. The structure erected above or under the land is regarded as
a "component part" of the right. Upon termination of the right the building
becomes the property of the owner of the land who owes compensation to the
holder of the right. See voN GiRKE, DAS SAOHENRECHT DES BMEGERLICHEN
RECHTS 134 (1959).
466. See B.G.B. §§ 1018, 1030.
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into usufruct and limited personal servitudes of a variable con-
tent. Habitation is the only limited personal servitude regulated
by the Civil Code in detail. 46 7 Today, transferable and heritable
rights of habitation, and use of buildings not suitable for habita-
tion, may be established by virtue of special legislation enacted
in 1951.468 The predial servitudes are limited rights of enjoy-
ment created in favor of another immovable and belonging to
the owner of the dominant estate.
The rights of real security and the real charges confer on
their holder authority to dispose of the thing, namely, to derive
satisfaction from its value following a judicial sale. The rights
of real security are either accessorial rights securing the per-
formance of an obligation or self-contained rights independent
of any obligation. Security devices on movable effects are
always accessorial rights; and, according to the system of the
Civil Code, delivery of possession to the creditor is a prerequisite
for their valid creation by contract.469 Rights of pledge created
by provision of the law either presuppose possession by the
holder or confer on him a right of possession. Security devices
on immovables are the various kinds of real mortgages, 47 which
are always accessorial rights, and "land-debts" (Grundschulden)
which may, but do not ordinarily, secure the performance of
an obligation.471 Land-debt is the right to obtain satisfaction
from an immovable in case of nonpayment of certain sums of
money due to the holder of the right. It is distinguished from
mortgage because the owner of the immovable does not incur a
"personal" responsibility for the payment of the indebtedness.
The land-debt is an "abstract" debt for which the immovable
itself is bound. The notion corresponds to a "strictly real obli-
gation" under the Louisiana Civil Code. 472
Contractual land-debts are rare today. The main importance
of the institution is that it may come into existence by operation
467. See B.G.B. § 1093.
468. See Law of March 15, 1951, RGB1. I 1951 175; HEDEMANN, SACHEN-
RECHT DES BtRGERLICHEN GESETZBUCHES 221-225 (1960).
469. See 1 ENNECCERUS-NIPPERDEY, ALLGEMEINER TEIL DES B]RGERLICHEN
RECHTS 298 (1952); B.G.B. §§ 1204, 1252, 1205.
470. See B.G.B. §§ 1113-1190; VON GIERKE, DAS SACHENRECHT DES BtRGER-
LICHEN RECHTS 161-184 (1959).
471. See B.G.B. §§ 1191, 1192; ENNECCERUS-NIPPERDEY, ALLGEMEINER TEIL
DES BtRGERLICHEN RECHTS 298 (1952); BAuR, LEHRBUCH DES SACHENRECHTS
366 (1960).
472. LA. CIvrIL CODE art. 1997 (1870): "[An obligation] is real when it is
attached to immovable property, and passes with it into whatever hands it may
come, without making the third possessor personally responsible."
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of law, sometimes without the knowledge and intention of the
parties and without any entry in the land-register (Grund-
buch) .473 In most such cases land-debts are held by the owner
of the immovable himself. They are called "owner's land-debts"
(Eigentiimergrundschulden) and their function is to secure to
the owner a share in the proceeds of an enforced auction which
corresponds to the rank of the land-debt in the order of priority
of claims. Consequently, a land-debt held by the owner of the
immovable prevents junior mortgages from rising in the order
of priority. To achieve this retention of the original rank of
junior mortgages and land-debts, the Code provides in a number
of cases that the real security, instead of being held by the
person who is entered in the land register, is actually held by
the owner of the immovable. 474 Land-debts are regulated by a
number of special provisions in the German Civil Code. 475 The
provisions governing mortgages apply by analogy, insofar as
they do not presuppose a personal obligation of the mortgagor. 476
A land-debt may be converted into a mortgage and vice versa. 477
A species of the land-debt is the "annuity-debt" (Rentenschuld),
namely, a right to the payment of an annuity or rent rather
than a lump sum out of an immovable. 478 The notion corresponds
to the "rent-charge" of the Louisiana Civil Code.479 In general,
the annuity debt is subject to the rules governing the land-debt.
The indebtedness may be capitalized and redeemed at the option
of the landowner, subject to the requirement of a six-months
statutory notice. 4 0 The right of redemption cannot be excluded
by agreement for a period exceeding thirty years. The holder
of the annuity-debt may demand redemption only in case his
security is imperilled and his notice for removal of the cause
of danger has lapsed. 48 ' The economic justification of the insti-
tution of land-debt is controversial. It has been predicted that
land-debts would lead to the "mobilization" of land ownership
and its fragmentization into a bundle of independent patrimonial
rights. It has been also criticized as favoring the creation of
473. See Cohn, The Law of Things, 1 FOREIGN OFFICE, MANUAL OF GERMAN
LAW 112, 143 (1950).
474. See, e.g., B.G.B. §§ 1163, 1168; BAUR, LEHRBUCH DES SACHENRECHTS
384-391 (1960).
475. B.G.B. §§ 191-1198.
476. B.G.B. § 1192.
477. B.G.B. § 1198.
478. B.G.B. § 1199; BAUR, LEHRRUCH DES SACHENRECHTS 392-3 (1960).
479. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 2017, 2018 (1870).
480. B.G.B. § 1202.
481. B.G.B. § 1201, referring to § 1133.
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secret encumbrances and as leading to an "unnatural" division
between "personal" and "real" obligations. Land-debts, however,
have been used cautiously and the predicted dangers have not
materialized. On the contrary, the institution has proved its
usefulness as a source of additional credit for landowners and as
an increased security for lenders. 4 2
The real charges (Reallasten) are rights whereby the holder
is entitled to demand from the owner of an immovable periodi-
cally recurring performances. 48 3 Holder of the right may be a
designated individual or the owner of a certain immovable. The
performances may consist in the payment of money, the delivery
of natural products, or the rendering of services. A modern
example is the charge on the property of electricity works to
furnish electric current to the holder of the right. The duration
of the right is unlimited; its scope, however, may be specifically
determined. A right to the periodical payment of fungibles is
termed ground-rent (Grundrent) .44 Such a rent may be payable
in fixed sums of money or in the value of certain quantities of
products. In addition to being a real right so that the holder
may obtain satisfaction directly from the immovable, the real
charge generates in the absence of contrary agreement an obli-
gatory right against the landowner whose immovable is charged.
In this case, the landowner is personally responsible, with his
entire patrimony, for the performance which the real charge
guarantees. Where personal responsibility is excluded, the land-
owner's responsibility for the payment of accrued performances
is limited to the value of the immovable. The regulation of real
charges in the Civil Code is sketchy and the matter has been
relegated for details to the law of the several states (Lander) .415
Real charges have practically fallen into disuse in Germany and
the main importance of the institution today consists in the fact
that the provisions governing real charges are applicable by
analogy in a number of special laws imposing public charges
upon privately owned land. 48 6 The juridical nature of real
482. See VON GIERKE, DAS SACHENRECHT DES BtYRGERLICHEN RECHTS 186
(1959).
483. B.G.B. § 1105; BAUR, LEHRBUCH DES SACHENRECHTS 270-272 (1960).
484. See VON GIERKE, DAS SACHENRECHT DES BtRGERLICHEN RECHTS 157
(1959).
485. B.G.B. §§ 1105-1112. Cf. Introductory Law to the Civil Code art. 113;
note 464 supra.
486. See Cohn, The Law of Things, 1 FOREIGN OFFICE, MANUAL OF GERMAN
LAW 112, 143 (1950) ; Prussian Law of Dec. 28, 1937, relating to Landesrenten-
bank, Prussian GESETZSAMMLUNG 283.
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charges was a cause cgl~bre prior to the enactment of the Civil
Code because they could not easily classify as real rights within
the framework of Roman law. But under the regime of the
Civil Code real charges are clearly real rights akin to real
security.487 Real charges differ from mortgages in that they do
not necessarily presuppose indebtedness of a capital sum and in
that their economic function resembles rights of use and en-
joyment. Real charges differ from servitudes because they may
consist in faciendo and also because there is no requirement
that they must be beneficial to the holder of the right. Finally,
real charges differ from land-debts and annuity-debts since ordi-
narily they are nontransferable, may result in personal responsi-
bility of the landowner, and upon termination of the right are
completely extinguished. 488
The number and incidents of rights of dominion are speci-
fied in the law and the creation of new rights or the modifica-
tion of the existing ones by private agreement is excluded. The
principle of contractual freedom in the field of property law
has only limited application. The parties to a contract are free
to create one of the recognized real rights and work modifica-
tions only where the law specifically allows it. It should be
noted, however, that unlike in France and Louisiana where
under the Civil Codes the real rights are few and inflexible, in
Germany the recognized forms of real rights are many and suf-
ficiently flexible to satisfy contemporary economic needs for the
exploitation of wealth.
The real rights of appropriation are mostly regulated by the
law of the several states. 49 The Civil Code regulates only the
right of the finder of a thing to become its owner after the lapse
of one year from the day he deposits it with the police authori-
ties;490 the right of a landowner to cut and appropriate roots
and branches of trees in neighboring estates extending to his
land ;491 the right of the state fiscal authorities to appropriate
abandoned immovables;492 the right of the possessor of a thing
belonging to another to separate and appropriate its substantial
487. See VoN GIERKE, DAS SACIIENRECHT DES BtRGERLICHEN RECHTS 158
(1959).
488. Id. at 189. Cf. text at notes 473-474 supra.
489. See 1 ENNECCEEUs-NIPPERDEY, ALLGEMEINER TEIL DES BYRGERLICHEN
RECHTS 299 (1952).
490. B.G.B. § 973.
491. Id. § 910.
492. Id. § 928.
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component parts;493 the right of a person to acquire ownership
or other real rights of dominion by virtue of recordation of a
caution ;494 and the rights of preemption of an immovable.495
These rights are classified as "real" because they refer to a
thing directly and are operative against third persons.
The right of preemption (Vorkaufsrecht) confers on its
holder the power to acquire the ownership of an object by virtue
of a sale upon transfer of this object to a third person. 49 6 This
right may be founded on a contract or on a legal provision. The
Civil Code regulates only the legal right of preemption accorded
to a co-heir with respect to objects forming part of the succes-
sion.49 7 Apart from the Civil Code, legal rights of preemption
are created by special federal legislation and by laws enacted
by the several states.498 Contractual rights of preemption may
be either obligatory rights, regulated in Sections 504-514 of the
Civil Code, or real rights, regulated in Sections 1094-1104 of the
same Code. Obligatory rights of preemption may exist as to
both movables and immovables; real rights of this kind may
be established only as to immovables. The contractual real right
of preemption may belong to a designated individual or to the
owner of a certain estate. This right is in the nature of an
encumbrance and is governed in part by the provisions govern-
ing real rights applied by analogy.499 The right vests upon the
completion of an attempted alienation, whether by contract or
as a result of a forced sale. It is exercised by an informal
unilateral declaration of intention addressed to the landowner.
The main practical significance of the institution is that the
relevant provisions of the Civil Code apply by analogy in a
number of special laws. Thus, under the Reich Settlement
Law (Reichssiedlungsgesetz) local authorities have a right of
preemption on "large" estates within their jurisdiction500 and
493. Id. § 997, 951.
494. Id. §§ 883, 888.
495. Id. § § 1094, 873.
496. Id. § 1097; VON GIERKE, DAS SACHENRECHT DES BfYRGERLICHEN RECHTS
153-55 (1959) ; BAUR, LEHRB3UCH DES SACHENRECHITS 172-174 (1960).
497. B.G.B. § 2034.
498. See notes 500-501 infra; VON GmRIE, DABS SACHENRECHT DES BtRGER-
LICHEN RECHTS 153 (1959).
499. Id. at 154.
500. The Reichssiedlungsgesetz of August 11, 1919 (RGB1. I 364, as amended,
RGB1. 1923 I 364 and 805) has authorized the creation of two types of settle-
ment organizations charged with the task to convert large scale agricultural hold-
ings into peasant settlements, the public settlement organizations and the land
supplying associations. These organizations have a right of preemption over
estates in their district of 25 hectars or more. This right does not require
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under the Reich Homestead Law (Reichsheimstdttengesetz)
the seller has a right of preemption on the homestead. 0 1
From the right of preemption is distinguished the right of
redemption (Wiederkaufsrecht). This right confers on its
holder the power to re-acquire the ownership. of an object pre-
viously sold. 0 2 It may be founded on a contract or on a legal
provision and may be either obligatory or real. The Civil Code
regulates only contractual obligatory rights of redemption spe-
cifically reserved in contracts of sales.503 The law of the several
states, the Reich Homestead Law and the Reich Settlement Law
create legal rights of redemption. The real right of redemption,
whether contractual or legal, is an encumbrance on the im-
movable. It may become effective in several specified circum-
stances and not only in case of an attempted alienation. 50 4
VI. GREEK LAW
An accepted division of private rights in Greek civilian
theory is into obligatory rights, real rights, family rights, in-
heritance rights, rights of personality, rights on the products of
one's own intellect, and the right to one's own name. 50 5
Particularly interesting is the distinction between obligatory
and real rights. Obligatory rights are defined as those whereby
one person (creditor) is entitled to demand from another person
(debtor) a performance, i.e., an act, an omission, or a forbear-
ance.50 6 These rights are also termed "personal," in contra-
recordation. The organizations have also a right of preemption if the settler does
not cultivate the land, if he sells or abandons it, or if he does not permanently
reside there.
501. The Reichsheimstdttengesetz of May 10, 1920, as amended, November 25,
1937 (RGB1. 1291) has authorized the creation of homesteads in favor of former
soldiers, families with many children, and widows of war victims. The homestead
consists of a house suitable for a family with garden or of an agricultural or
horticultural tract of land. The holder of the homestead acquires ownership
subject to certain limitations. Partition, enlargement, or encumbering of the
homestead may be made only with the consent of the grantor, i.e., the Reich, a
Land, or municipality. The character of the immovable as homestead is indicated
in the land register. The grantor has a legal right of preemption at a fixed price
if the holder sells the homestead, and a right of redemption at the same price if
the holder grossly neglects the homestead, does not cultivate the land, or if he
does not reside there.
502. See VON GIERKE, DAS SACHENRECHT DES BtRGERLICHEN RECITS 156
(1959).
503. B.G.B. § 497.
504. See VON GIERKE, DAS SACHENRECHT DES BR4RGERLICHEN RECHTS 157
(1959).
505. See BALIS, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE CIVIL LAW 74-83 (1955) (in
Greek).
506. Id. at 74. Cf. GREEK CIVIL CODE art. 287 (1946) : "Obligation is the
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distinction with "real" rights, because they confer authority
over the person of a determined debtor. Obligatory rights need
not be appreciable in money; in such a case, however, a judg-
ment obtained by the creditor cannot be specifically enforced.
Correlative to the right of the creditor is the duty of the debtor.
The legal relation between the two is termed "obligation."
Obligations may derive from juridical acts or directly from a
legal provision. 50 7
Real rights are defined as those which confer an immediate
and absolute authority over a thing.50 8 These rights avail
against the world (erga omnes). They are analyzed as involv-
ing legal relationships between persons rather than between
persons and things. But unlike obligatory relationships whose
immediate content is power over the person of a determined
debtor and only indirectly over a thing, the immediate content
of real rights is power over a thing and only indirectly over an
indeterminate number of persons. When the power over a thing
exhausts all its utility, the right is ownership. When this power
exhausts only part of the thing's utility, the right is a jus in re
aliena, i.e., servitude, pledge, or mortgage. Possession, deten-
tion, and quasi-possession are sui generis rights, neither real nor
personal. Real rights other than those enumerated cannot be
created by private agreement nor can the content of these rights
be altered. 0 9  Modifications of recognized real rights in the
exercise of contractual freedom are operative only between the
parties to the contract. Only exceptionally, in the case of predial
and personal servitudes, the law permits the parties to deter-
mine the "utility" to be derived by the dominant estate or the
holder of the personal servitude. 510 Real rights can be estab-
lished only on things, i.e., corporeal objects in commerce in-
dividually determined.5 1' By way of exception, the Civil Code
recognizes usufruct and pledge of incorporeals, and mortgage
relationship whereby one person is bound toward another person to furnish a
performance. The performance may consist in a forbearance." See also Fragistas,
General introduction to the Law of Obligations, in II ERml. A.K. 2, 7 (1959)
(in Greek).
507. See 1 ZEPos, LAW OF OBLIGATIONS 54 (1955) (in Greek) ; BALIS, GEN-
ERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE CIVIL LAW 74-75 (1955) (in Greek).
508. BALIS, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE CIVIL LAW 76 (1955) (in Greek)
cf. ZEPOS, Law of Things and Real Actions in Greece, 29 TUL. L. REV. 697
(1955).
509. See BALis, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE CIVIL LAW 76 (1955); id.,
LAW OF PROPERTY 5 (1955) (in Greek).
510. GREEK CIVIL CODE arts. 1118, 1188 (1946). See also id. arts. 1220-1222
(determination by the parties of the scope of pledge).
511. On the notion of "things" in Greek civil law, see Yiannopoulos, Intro-
duction to the Law of Things, 22 LA. L. REV. 756, 763 (1962).
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of the usufruct of an immovable.5 12 Where several things are
subject to a real right in favor of the same person, there are as
many real rights as there are things. This means that there
can be no real right over a universality.518 The creation of jura
in re aliena, even in performance of an obligation, is a real trans-
action and as such subject to the rule of temporal priority (prior
tempore potior lure). Real rights may be of limited duration
either by law or agreement, and may be subject to term or con-
ditions. When the real right terminates, all rights granted by
the holder of the right over the thing are extinguished.
The differences between real rights and obligations may be
summarized as follows. Real rights, in contrast to obligations,
are subject to the rule of temporal priority and confer the right
to follow and the right of preference; as to their content and
form, real rights are subject to rules authoritatively determined
by law rather than to the principle of contractual freedom; they
are "static" as tending to perpetuate themselves while obliga-
tions are "dynamic" as tending to be extinguished upon per-
formance; they are "absolute" as available against the world
while obligations are "relative" as available against a deter-
mined debtor; real rights, finally, confer "immediate" power
over a thing rather than "indirect" authority through the inter-
vention of a debtor.5 14 These differences, though tending to dis-
appear in connection with a number of particular rights, suf-
ficiently warrant the validity of the distinction for systematic
purposes.
CONCLUSIONS
The distinction between personal and real rights is a syste-
matic generalization deeply embedded in the civilian tradition
and known to all western systems of law. Yet, neither analytical
jurisprudence 515 nor civilian theory"1 6 succeeded to furnish gen-
erally acceptable criteria for this distinction and for the deter-
mination of the respective nature of personal and real rights.
As a result, there is still much disagreement among jurists con-
cerning the classification of certain rights as personal or real
within the framework of contemporary legal systems. Classi-
fications made by commentators, legislatures, and courts seem
512. GREEK CIVIL CODE arts. 1178, 1247, 1259 (1946).
513. On the notion of "universalities," see Yiannopoulos, Introduction to the
Law of Things, 22 LA. L. REV. 756, 781 (1962).
514. See 1 ZEpos, LAW OF OBLIGATIONS 39-45 (1955) (in Greek).
515. See text at notes 450452 aupra.
516. See text at notes 17-20, 4348 aupra.
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to be in connection with particular rights more arbitrary than
consistent with a coherent theory.
Perhaps, as in the case of most analytical generalizations,
the search for everlasting criteria is doomed to failure. A liv-
ing and growing law cannot be put on a conceptual Procrustean
bed. The living law of growing societies adjusts itself to new
forms of human relations and it is to be expected that some of
these forms would resist, and perhaps defy, classification within
conceptual patterns of the past. The distinction between real
and personal rights was devised to explain the structure and
function of certain institutions of Roman law at a time when
that law has ceased to grow and actually was a law in the books.
Today, this distinction may serve only as a starting point of
analysis and may be useful for pedagogical purposes. But, cer-
tainly, it does not adequately correspond with the actual func-
tion of several types of rights in contemporary legal systems.
In Louisiana, the theory of real rights has remained obscure,
in part because of the lack of doctrinal studies. There is much
confusion concerning the nature, structure, and function of real
rights as distinguished from personal rights. As a consequence,
there is some judicial ambivalence concerning the classification
of certain rights as personal or real; in turn, this has led to a
questionable interpretation of the Code and of special legisla-
tion.
The question concerning the nature and structure of real
rights in Louisiana is a theoretical one but has practical impli-
cations where courts are asked to grant relief on the basis of
conflicting claims concerning the nature of the rights involved
in litigation. In these circumstances generalizations derived
from previously decided cases and legislative texts may deter-
mine the outcome of the judicial proceedings. But these gener-
alizations, the very concepts of real and personal rights, proved
to be in part inadequate and in part incoherent. In the light of
Louisiana law it can only be stated that real rights are the rights
of ownership and its recognized dismemberments. However, this
is an ambiguous proposition which begs the question because
the nature and structure of ownership and of its "recognized"
dismemberments remain undefined and unknown. Ultimately,
classification of new forms of rights will depend on the char-
acterization of particular interests as "dismemberments of own-
ership" in accordance with a sound judicial process. It is in the
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light of these considerations that in this study attention has been
focused on the function of particular rights as a prerequisite for
an acceptable classification. The results have been tested against
the traditional ideas and it has been indicated which rights may
be classified in Louisiana as real, consistent with the premises
of the Civil Code and the civilian tradition. The question of the
nature and structure of these rights has been left open along
with the question of the desirability of the distinction between
real and personal rights in Louisiana.
Real rights in Louisiana can be divided into those established
by the Civil Code and those created by special legislation and
jurisprudence. Under the Civil Code real rights are ownership
and the jura in re aliena.5 17 Ownership, whether perfect or im-
perfect, is a real right whether its object is a movable or an im-
movable. Jura in re aliens are the predial and personal servi-
tudes (i.e., usufruct, use, and habitation), rights of real secu-
rity (i.e., pawn, antichresis, and mortgage), superficies, emphy-
teusis, and a number of real charges.5 18 With the exception of
usufruct and use which can exist on both movables and im-
nmovables, and pawn which can exist on movables only, all other
jura in re aliena can exist only on immovables. Possession under
the Civil Code is a sui generis right.519 Predial lease is a person-
al right though, in some respects, it functions as a real right.5 20
Real rights can exist on both corporeal and incorporeal things.
Thus, there can be pledge of an incorporeal5 21 and mortgage of
the usufruct of an immovable. 522 Privileges under the Civil Code
are causes of preference rather than real rights. However, the
vendor's recorded privilege on the immovable sold is a veritable
mortgage.,2 3 The vendor's privilege on movables, 24 and the les-
sor's privilege 5 25 are merely causes of preference. The vendor's
right of dissolution is neither personal nor real but a right to
transform a legal relationship.5 20 And the promise to sell an
immovable, if recorded, is not a distinct real right but plain
ownership.5
27
517. See text at notes 67-68 supra.
518. See text at notes 68-69, 73-89, 90-104, 384-94 supra.
519. See text at notes 70-72 supra.
520. See text at notes 105-112 supra.
521. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3281 (1870).
522. Id. art. 3289.
523. See text at notes 322-3 supra.
524. See text at note 322 supra.
525. See text at notes 359 supra.
526. See text at note 340 supra.
527. See text at note 365 supra.
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Under special legislation real rights are the "timber es-
tates"528 (which could be classified as a species of emphyteusis),
the ownership of individual apartments 529 (which could be re-
garded as a species of superficies), chattel mortgages,5 30 and
mineral leases.5 31 Under the jurisprudence real rights are the
mineral servitudes and the mineral royalties.5 3 2 Mineral leases
are classified as personal rights, though in most aspects, they
function as real rights.5 33 Restraints on the use and disposition
of property, including building restrictions, are clearly real
rights in the nature of predial servitudes.
5 3 4
The preceding list of real rights in Louisiana is not exclusive.
The principle of contractual freedom may function in the field
of property law within the limits of a broadly defined public
policy and parties may create new forms of real rights and may
modify the recognized ones. 535 This jurisprudential approach is
sound. Progressive legal systems have either abandoned the doc-
trine of limited number of real rights53 or have permitted the
creation of real rights within the pattern of several flexible
forms sufficient to satisfy the needs of a growing economy.
53 7
In case of a future revision of the Louisiana Civil Code the
concept of real rights could, perhaps, be avoided. Specific rules
applicable to each category of rights now known as real could,
at the cost of possible duplication, solve perennial problems con-
cerning application by analogy of rules enacted to apply to sets
of quite different rights. If for historical and systematic rea-
sons the concept of real rights were to be preserved, then care
should be taken to specify which rights are real. A measure of
contractual freedom ought to be guaranteed by special provision
which would also prescribe the limits of this freedom. A set of
rules designed to apply to all real rights could be drafted with
appropriate exceptions in indicated cases. And, by virtue of a
special provision, rules governing real rights in general could
be made applicable to certain personal rights without thereby
affecting their nature.
528. See text at notes 205-233 supra.
529. See text at notes 119-138 supra.
530. See text at notes 258-278 supra.
531. See text at notes 156-158 supra.
532. See text at notes 148, 177 supra.
533. See text at notes 160, 163-67 supra.
534. See text at notes 234-257 8upra.
535. See text at notes 113-117 supra.
536. See text at note 32 supra.
537. See text at notes 488-489 supra.
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